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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY: Standing
Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245 (2nd Cir. 1994).
Dana Leigh Thompson appealed a district court order dismissing her
complaint. The district court held that Thompson lacked standing to challenge
a county government's collection of taxes on her real property which she
alleges is within the boundaries of the St. Regis Mohawk Indian Reservation.'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
decision by holding that an individual member of an Indian tribe has standing
to challenge a county government's taxing authority The court further held
that Thompson met the standing requirement by predicating her challenge on
the jurisdictional boundaries of the Indian reservation, and not on the validity
of conveyances of land interests within the reservation to non-Indians.'
Thompson, an enrolled member of the St. Regis Mohawk Indian Tribe,
bought property in 1989.! The property was located in the area of Franklin
County, New York and the St. Regis Mohawk Indian Reservation.5 The
County began assessing taxes on the real property in 1989.6 Thompson did
not pay the taxes on the ground that her property was located within the
Reservation boundaries.1 By being on the Reservation, her real property lay
outside the County's jurisdiction. The County continued assessing taxes up
until 1992, when Thompson filed suit.8
Thompson filed suit in the state court of New York, under 25 U.S.C. §
233.' The County had the action removed to federal court and filed a motion
to dismiss."0 Thompson filed a motion to remand the case back to state court
1. Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245 (2nd Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 247.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 245.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 246.
.7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The statute states, in relevant part, "[t]hat nothing herein contained shall be construed
as subjecting the lands within any Indian reservation in the State of New York to taxation for
State or local purposes .. . ." 25 U.S.C. § 233 (1988).
10. Thwmpson, 15 F.3d at 246.
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on the ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant
to the Tax Injunction Act." The federal court denied Thompson's motion to
remand by finding that the Tax Injunction Act" did not preclude federal
jurisdiction in this case. The district court also granted the County's motion
to dismiss, holding that Thompson lacked standing 3 because the case was
ultimately based on the Nonintercourse Act."'
Thompson contended that the district court mischaracterized her claim as
dependent upon the Nonintercourse Act." Rather, Thompson claimed that
her case turned on the distinction between title and property located within a
reservation and the jurisdictional boundaries of the reservation.'6 The County
had relied on conveyance agreements dating back to 1816, which gave New
York interest in several parcels of land within the boundaries of the
Reservation, to give the County jurisdiction. 7 An attack on these
conveyances under the Nonintercourse Act," which the County alleged
Thompson was pursuing, would need to be carried out by an Indian tribe, not
an individual member of a tribe. The court found that the district court
holding based upon the Nonintercourse Act" was irrelevant to this case's
disposition."
Thompson claimed that the County lacked jurisdiction to assess taxes on
real property in Indian country.2' The court referred to Solent v. Bartlett,"
which held that Indian country included lands held by non-Indians within
reservation boundaries.' The court held that the conveyance of reservation
land to non-Indians does not dissolve the reservation boundaries for
jurisdictional purposes. 4
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Thompson, 15 F.3d at 247.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988). The Act states, in pertinent part: "No purchase, grant, lease or
other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Id.
15. Id.
16. Thompson, 15 F.3d at 249.
17. Id. at 250.
18. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988).
19. Id
20. Thompson, 15 F.3d at 251.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988). The statute "define[s] Indian country broadly to include formal
and informal reservations ... and Indian allotments, whether restricted or held in trust by the
United States." Oklahoma Tax Comim'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 113 S. Ct. 1985, 1991 (1993)
(ho.ding that an Indian tribe member need not live on a reservation to be outside State's taxing
jurisdiction; the member need only live in "Indian country").
22. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).





The court further stated that the holding was not dispositive of whether
Thompson had standing.' The court also stated it had an independent
obligation to inquire into the standing of litigants to bring actions in the lower
courts, regardless of whether either party raised the issue.' The County
claimed that to allow individual Indian tribal members to challenge a local
government tax based on jurisdictional boundaries would impede the rights of
the Tribe and threaten established reservation boundaries" The court
disagreed and held that the federal courts will vindicate the rights of
individual taxpayers where the government has sought to impose a tax burden
beyond its borders.' The court failed to see a difference between
Thompson's claim and "the plethora of lawsuits routinely brought in federal
courts by individual . . . taxpayers . . .who challenge the territorial
boundaries of a government's taxing jurisdiction."'"
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Thompson had
standing to bring this action and reversed the district court's dismissal of the
claim." The case was remanded to the district court and reinstated for
further proceedings?'
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
GAMING: Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. National Indian Gaming
Commission, 16 F.3d 261 (8th Cir. 1994).
The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, Little Six, Inc., the Lower
Sioux Community and the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe (the Tribes),
appealed three district court decisions upholding the regulations of the
National Indian Gaming Commission (the Commission). The decisions
classified "keno" as a class I game under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA)." The district courts granted summary judgment to the Commission,
applying the doctrine of deference to agency rule making as defined in
25. Id. at 251.
26. See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
27. Thompson, 15 F.3d at 251.
28. Id. at 252.
29. Id. at 253.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 254.
32. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
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Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council? The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district courts' decisions by holding that the
Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in regulating keno as a
class I game under IGRA.'
However, the Tribes asserted that the Commission's classification of keno
as a class mII gameS was arbitrary and capricious. The Tribes also argued
that keno has a close relationship to bingo and should have been considered
"similar to bingo"' so that it would be within class II gaming. 7
The court used the Chevron test to determine whether the Commission
acted arbitrarily.38 The Chevron test consists of two parts. First, the court
must determine if congressional intent is clear from the plain language of the
statute." If the language is ambiguous, the court then looks to legislative
history."' When clear intent is found through either part of the Chevron test,
then an agency ruling contrary to that intent is not given deference.4'
However, if the language is ambiguous and the legislative history provides no
33. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34. Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n, 16 F.3d
261, 265 (8th Cir. 1994).
35. IGRA states that class III gaming includes all forms of gaming that are not class I
gaming or class II gaming. This class requires a tribal-state compact governing the gaming. 25
U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
36. Shakopee, 16 F.3d at 264.
37. IGRA states, in pertinent part:
(7)(A) The term "class II gaming" means:
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not electronic,
computer or other technologic aids are used in connection therewith)-
(I) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with cards
bearing numbers or other designations,
(1I) in which the holder of the card covers such numbers or designations
when objects, similarly numbered ordesignated, are drawn or electronically
determined, and
(IIl) in which the game is won by the first person covering a previously
designated arrangement of numbers or designations on such cards,
including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto, punch boards, tip
jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to bingo ....
(B) The term "class If gaming" does not include
(i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack
(21), or
(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot
machines of any kind.
25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (1988).
38. Shakopee, 16 F.3d at 264; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
39. Shakopee, 16 F.3d at 263 (applying Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
40. Id.




clear congressional intent, deference is given to a reasonable agency
decision'
The court found the language of the statute "similar to bingo"'43 to be
ambiguous. The court also found that the legislative history did not reveal a
clear congressional intent to classify keno as a game similar to bingo."
The Tribes argued that the Chevron deference standard should not be
applied to the Commission because it is a new agency.4 The Tribes claimed
that the Commission did not have the specialized expertise that Chevron
assumes." The court stated that agency decisions cannot be lightly replaced
by the courts regardless of the agencies experience.47
The second part of the Chevron test reviews legislative history in
considering whether the Commission acted arbitrarily when it classified keno
as a class III game.48 The court found that the Commission classified keno
as a class I game because it is a house banking game. The Tribes claimed
that this classification was ambiguous ° The tribes asserted that the canon
of statutory construction which construes statutes with ambiguous provisions
liberally in favor of Indians had been violated'
The court found that IGRA has dual purposes:
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by
an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and
other corrupting influences .... '
The court held that the Commission separated house banking games from
other types of games in order to shield Indian gaming from corrupting
influences." The Tribes' claim that the Commission was not interpreting
IGRA in their favor was rejected by the court.0 The court concluded that the
Commission did not act arbitrarily or counter to the requirement that statutes
with ambiguous provisions be interpreted in favor of Indian tribes simply
42. Id.; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
43. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(i) (1988).
44. Shakopee, 16 F.3d at 264.
45. Id. at 264 n.4.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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because it reached a disfavored result." The court stated that it "need not be
persuaded that an agency reached the best possible decision in order to uphold
reasonable agency action."' The district court's decisions to defer to the
Commission's regulations including keno in class III gaming were affirmed by
th- court.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
GAMIING: Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994).
This appeal is a consolidation of two cases from two district courts.58 Both
cases question whether Congress can abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment 9 sovereign immunity from suit by enacting the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA).M The first case involved the Seminole Tribe, where
the State of Florida moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
based on sovereign immunity. The district court denied the motion and the State
of Florida filed an interlocutory appeal." The second case, against the Poarch
Band of Creek Indians, was dismissed under a defense of sovereign immunity.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the
Florida district court's action and affirmed the District Court of Alabama's
dismissal.' The court held that: (1) The-states did not consent to suits in any
way; (2) Congress intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity by enacting IGRA; and (3) Congress enacted IGRA pursuant to the
Indian Commerce Clause which does not grant Congress the power to




58. The two cases are Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992) and
Poareh Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991) (Poarch I). See
also Poareh Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (Poarch II).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment states: "The judicial power ofthe United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any Foreign
Statle." Id.
60. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
61. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 656.
62. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
63. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The Clause states, in relevant part: "The Congress shall
have the Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." Id.




The Seminole Tribe of Florida and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (the
Tribes) attempted to negotiate with Florida and Alabama respectively (the
States) for tribal-state gaming compacts' Under the statute, tribes initiate
negotiations with the states. IGRA mandates that states negotiate in good faith
with tribes in order to reach a compact. The Secretary of the Interior must then
agree to the compact.
If a state refuses to negotiate in good faith, IGRA provides the tribes with
a remedy in the federal courts. The federal courts have jurisdiction over any
cause "initiated by an Indian Tribe arising from the failure of a state to enter
into negotiations with the Tribe. . .or to conduct such negotiations in good
faith."'7 The court may order the state and tribe to come to an agreement
within a certain period.' If this fails, the Secretary of the Interior is authorized
to provide the regulations for the gaming.Y
IGRA classifies Indian gaming into three categories. The categories are class
I, class II and class ll." Class ImI gaming, which is implicated in this action,
is the only category of gaming under IGRA in which the states are allowed
some regulation in the form of the tribal-state compact'
The Tribes asserted that the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity was
limited because the States consented to this suit. The court relied on Supreme
Court holdings that consent may be found in three circumstances." The first
is express consent which must be explicitly authorized by the state in its
constitution or statutes.' The court found that Alabama had a provision in its
constitution which reserved Alabama's sovereign immunity.' Even though
Florida did not claim a similar defense, the court held that the Tribes failed to
show that either state had expressly consented to this suit.7'
The second form of consent is derived from the states' ratification of tie U.S.
Constitution and is called the "plan of the convention" consent.' This form
implies that by ratifying the Constitution, the states waived their immunity to
suit in certain cases.' The court cited Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak
65. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (1988).
66. Id. § 2710.
67. Seminole Tribe, II F.3d at 1024 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1988)).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(7)(B)(vi) (1988).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 2703(6), (7)(A), (8).
71. Id. § 2710(d)(1). ,
72. Seminole Tribe, II F.3d at 1022.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 641-46 (1892); South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
74. Seminole Tribe, II F.3d at 1022; see, e.g., Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1214
(I Ith Cir. 1986) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Transp., 323 U.S. 459, 467 (1945));
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
75. Seminole Tribe, II F.3d at 1022.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 641-46 (1892); South Dakota v. North
No. 1] 247
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as a basis for rejecting the argument that the States waived their immunity to
suit by the Tribes based upon the States' ratification of the U.S. Constitution.
Blatchford held that states have a mutuality of concession with other states
because they all have ratified the U.S. Constitution. This makes the surrender
of immunity possible between the states. However, the Indian tribes have
never ratified the U.S. Constitution, so there is no mutuality of concession
between the Indian tribes and the states. Thus, the States have not waived their
immunity to suit by the Tribes based upon the plan of the convention consent."
The final form of consent is very limited. It is based on the states
paricipation in a federal program which compels the state to consent to suit as
a requirement for participation.' This form of consent has only been found in
one case: Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama." As in Parden, the Tribes
asserted that the States consented to suit by participating in negotiations with the
Tribes as mandated by IGRA." The court distinguished Parden because it was
based on the fact that the state had left the area of state authority and entered
into the private market, which made the state subject to the same requirements
as all participants including consent to suit. In the present action, the court
found that Parden was inapplicable because the negotiation between the States
and the Tribes was not a private activity."
The Eleventh Amendment immunity issue was addressed by the court with
a two-part inquiry. The first part involved determining if congressional intent
in the statutory language is unequivocal and textual." The court found that
Congress had expressed unequivocally its intent under IGRA to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity!' The court found that to give effect
to subsection 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) of IGRA, which allows federal jurisdiction over
cases that arise from the states' failure to enter into negotiations or to negotiate
in good faith with Indian tribes for a gaming compact, is an abrogation of states'
sovereign immunity." The second part of the inquiry asks whether Congress
possessed the power under the Constitution to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity ° The Supreme Court has held that Congress possesses
the power to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under section 5 of the
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
79. 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
30. Id. at 2582-83.
81. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1022 (interpreting Blatchford, 111 S. Ct. at 2582-83).
32. Id.
83. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
34. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1022.
:85. Id. at 1023.
36. Id.
:37. Id. at 1024; see Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989).
:38. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1024.
:39. Id.




Fourteenth Amendment,C ' and under the Interstate Commerce Clause.'
Therefore, the Tribes alleged that in enacting IGRA, Congress acted in
accordance with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstae
Commerce Clause, as well as the Indian Commerce Clause 3
The Tribes asserted that IGRA creates a liberty interest as well as a property
interest, which are both entitled to constitutional protection.' The Tribes
declared that the States' input into the negotiations under IGRA is similar to a
licensing requirement. Therefore, failure by the States to enter into a compact
is similar to an unconstitutional denial of a license."
The court reasoned that liberty and property interests are created only when
there is an entitlement to them." The court further reasoned that IGRA does
not create an entitlement for gambling operations; it only establishes standards
for conducting gambling on Indian lands.' Therefore, the court held that
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not used to abrogate the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity
The Tribes alleged that Congress legislated against organized crime"
because it was a burden to interstate commerce." Noting that Congress' goal
in enacting IGRA included shielding Indian gaming from organized crime,"'
the Tribes argued that IGRA was enacted pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause,'" a constitutional tool used to stop organized crime as well as to
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.'" The court disagreed with the
Tribes' assessment and found that Congress intended instead for IGRA to
promote tribal economic development, ensure the tribes were the primary
beneficiary, and assure the games were operated fairly and honestly."
The court further held that Congress enacted IGRA solely under the Indian
Commerce Clause." The Tribes claimed that Congress has the power to
91. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Fourteenth Amendment states, in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
92. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
93. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1025.
94. Id.




99. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
100. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1025.
101. Id.
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
103. Seminole Tribe, II F.3d at 1025.
104. Id. at 1026 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702(I)-(2) (1988)).
105. Id.
No. 1] 249
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abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause." The Tribes relied on Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.," which held
that Congress has the power to enact legislation, pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Clause, which may abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity." The Tribes asserted that Union Gas controls all Interstate
Commerce Clause and Indian Commerce Clause cases. "'
The court distinguished Union Gas and limited its application to interstate
commerce only."' The court reasoned that the Interstate Commerce Clause
and the Indian Commerce Clause have different underlying purposes and should
be treated distinctly."' The court further reasoned that since Congress only has
power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the
Interstate Commerce Clause or section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, no
power exists under the Indian Commerce Clause."' Since IGRA was enacted
solely under the Indian Commerce Clause, the court found that Congress acted
improperly.13
The Tribes' final argument was that they may sue the governors of Alabama
and Florida to compel negotiations under IGRA."' The Tribes relied on Ex
Parte Young,"' which states that an individual may force a state officer to
comply with federal law."6 The court held that the Young doctrine did not
apply because of two exceptions."'
The first exception was that the doctrine cannot be used to compel a state
officer to undertake a discretionary task."' The court found that IGRA
provides for the negotiation of a compact and gives the states and tribes the
discretion regarding its terms."" The states are also given the choice as to
negotiate or not." The holding of the court was that the States retained their
Eleventh Amendment immunity through the exception to the Young doctrine,
whEch does not allow a state official to be compelled to undertake a
discretionary task."'
106. Id. at 1027.
107. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
108. Seminole Tribe, I I F.3d at 1026 (interpreting Pennsylvania, 491 U.S. at 19-20 (1989)).
109. Id. at 1027.
110. Id. at 1028.
Ill. Id. at 1025 n.9.
112. Id. at 1026.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1028.
115. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
116. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1028.
117. Id.
118. Young, 209 U.S. at 158.
119. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1028.
120. Id.




The second exception was that if the suit is in reality against the state and
not its officials, the Young doctrine is inapplicable.'" The court held that the
Young doctrine did not survive this exception either, by finding that IGRA
addresses the states and never imposes any duties or responsibilities on any
officer of the state.'" The court reversed the Southern District Court of
Florida's decision and remanded the case to the district court so it could
dismiss the case.24 Therefore, the court affirmed the Southern District Court
of Alabama and dismissed the case."2
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
GAMING: Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Commission, 14
F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, et al. (the Tribes)" appealed a district
court order that granted summary judgment to the National Indian Gaming
Commission (the Commission)." The district court held that computerized
pull-tab games are "clearly ... facsimiles of games of chance and therefore
are class III gaming."'' The Tribes then sought and were granted an
injunction, which prohibited the Commission from interfering with the Tribes'
use and operation of computerized pull-tab games." The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia vacated the injunction and affirmed the holding
of the district court." The court held that video pull-tab games are, under
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), class III "electronic
122. Id. at 1029 (interpreting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
101-02 (1984)).
123. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(7)(B)(iii) (1988)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. The eight tribes are: Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians, Poarch Band of Creek Indians, Pueblo of Isleta, Rumsey Rancheria, San Manuel Band
of Mission Indians, Spokane Tribe, and Delaware Tribe of Western Oklahoma.
127. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n, 14 F.3d 633,
634 (referring to Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n, 827 F.
Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1993)).
128. Id. at 636 (quoting Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming
Comm'n, 827 F. Supp. 26, 32 (D.D.C. 1993)).
129. Id. at 634. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia granted the
injunction on September 23, 1993.
130. Id.
No. 1]
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facsimiles"' 3 rather than class II pull-tab games which use "electronic,
computer or technologic aids."'3
The Tribes asserted that sections 502.7 and 502.8 of the Commission's
regulations' improperly included computerized pull-tab games"" in a
different class than noncomputerized pull-tab games.3 The court held that
no need existed to consider the Commission's regulations because the decision
was "a simple one that may be accomplished solely be examining the statute
itself."'
The Tribes conceded that the computerized version of pull-tab games is the
same as the paper version.'37 The court held that this concession
demonstrated that computerized pull-tab gaming is not in the class II category,
131. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8) (1988).
132. Cabazon, 14 F.3d at 635 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(7)(A), 2703(7)(B)(ii) (1988)).
133. 25 C.F.R. § 502.7-.8 (1993). Section 502.7 states:
Electronic, computer or other technologic aid means a device such as a
computer, telephone, cable, television, satellite or bingo blower and that when
used-
(a) Is not a game of chance but merely assists a player or the playing of a
game;
(b) Is readily distinguishable from the playing of a game of chance on an
electronic or electromechanical facsimile; and
(c) Is operated according to applicable Federal communications law.
Id. § 502.7. Section 502.8 states: "Electronic or electromechanical facsimile means any gambling
device as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a)(2) or(3)." Id. § 502.8. Title 15 U.S.C. § 1171(a) states,
in pertinent part:
(a) The term "gambling device" means- -
(2) any other machine or mechanical device (excluding slot-machines;
including, but not limited to, roulette wheels and similar devices) designed and
manufactured primarily for use in connection with gambling, and (A) which when
operated may deliver, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any
money or property, or (B) by the operation of which a person may become entitled
to receive, as the result of the application of an element of chance, any money or
property; or
(3) any subassembly or essential part intended to be used in connection with
such machine or mechanical device, but which is not attached to any such machine
or mechanical device as a constituent part.
II U.S.C. § 1171(a) (1988).
134. Cabazon, 14 F.3d at 635. The game of "pull-tabs" in its common form is the paper
version. A card is purchased from a deck and the tab is pulled open to reveal if the purchaser is
a winner. In the paper version, each player competes against all others in the room playing pull.
tab. There are a predetermined number of winning cards with each deal. In the computerized
version of pull-tabs, the computer selects the card for the player, pulls the tab open when the
player directs it to, and displays the result on the screen. The player'in the computerized version
does not play against other players.
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian Gaming Comm'n, 827
F. Supp. 26, 32 (D.D.C. 1993)).




because class II gaming does not include "electronic or electromechanical
facsimiles of any game of chance."'" The court stated that facsimiles are
exact copies or duplicates and quoted Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v.
Roache,3  which defined facsimiles as "a device that preserves the
fundamental characteristics of a game.'"" The court then concluded that the
computerized version of pull-tab gaming is an electronic facsimile in that it
exactly duplicates the paper version of pull-tab gaming. 4'
The Tribes alleged that the use of technology would create a class II pull-
tab game only if that technology created a different game than what the game
would be without the technology.4 According to the Tribes, the
computerized pull-tab games are considered to be aids to the paper pull-tab
games, not a different version.43 The court held that IGRA excluded
electronic facsimiles from class II gaming when those games are wholly
incorporated into an electronic or electromechanical version.'"
The Tribes' last assertion was that statutes which are ambiguous must be
construed in the Tribes' favor.4 ' The court held that the Tribes focused only
on IGRA's purpose of advancing tribal economic interests." IGRA was also
enacted to protect tribes from the dangers of large-scale gambling
operations. 47 The court found that the construction which most favors the
Tribes is the one which places the computerized version of pull-tab gaming
in the more restrictive class III grouping.'" In addition, the court stated that
the statutory language is clear, rendering the Tribes' contention meritless.'
49
LEGISLATION
Indian Tribal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004-08 (codified
at 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3631 (West Supp. 1994))
The purpose of the Indian Tribal Justice Act (the Act) is to assist the
development of tribal justice systems. The Act was passed to improve
138. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B)(ii) (1988)).
139. 19 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3079 (S.D. Cal. 1992).
140. Id. at 3080-81, quoted in Cabazon, 14 F.3d at 636.




145. Id. at 637; see Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).




150. H.R. REP. No. 205, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2425.
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administration and provide resources for the tribes to operate tribal forums
with adequate resources, training, funding, and guidance.'' The Act was
also set up to help Indian tribal justice systems achieve respect and
"congressional support for the recognition of tribal court judgments by state
courts and authorities."'1
A government-to-government relationship, Congress declared, exists
between the United States and each Indian tribe. 3 Congress recognized the
inherent sovereignty of each tribe and that each tribe possesses the authority
to establish their own form of a tribal justice system." 4 Congress found that
inadequate funding of tribal justice systems impairs their operation.' This
Act's purpose is to involve tribal governments in improving their tribal justice
systems."
The Act establishes the Office of Tribal Justice Support (the Office) within
the Bureau of Indian, Affairs of the Department of the Interior.' The
purpose of the Office is to "further the development, operation and
enhancement of tribal justice systems and Courts of Indian Offenses."'59 In
order to accomplish this purpose, the Office shall: (1) provide funds to Indian
tribes for the development and operation of tribal justice systems and
traditional tribal judicial practices; (2) provide, upon request by the tribes,
technical assistance and training, including, but not limited to, developing
tribal codes, rules of procedure, tribal court administrative procedures, court
recoxds management systems, methods of alternate dispute resolution, methods
of reducing cost delay, long-range plans for improving tribal justice systems,
and tribal standards for judicial administration and conduct, either directly or
by contract with independent entities of through grants to the tribes;" (3)
research the operation of tribal justice systems;" (4) promote cooperation
and coordination among tribal justice systems and federal and state judiciary
systems;' and (5) oversee the operations of the Court of Indian
Offenses." The Office is also required to maintain information on staffing,
151. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 383, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1993), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2453, 2457.
152. H.R. REP. No. 205, supra note 150, at 5, 6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N, at 2426
(quoting U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs Acr: A REPORT 74 (1991)).
153. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3601(1) (West Supp. 1994).
154. Id. § 3601(3)-(4).
155. Id. § 3601(8).
156. Id. § 3601(9).
157. Id § 3611(a).
158. Id. § 3611(a).
159. Id. § 361 1(c)(1), (6).
160. Id. § 3611(c)(2). (e).
161. Id. § 361 l(c)(3).
162. Id. § 361 1(c)(4).




funding, model tribal codes, tribal justice activities, and tribal justice
decisions. '
Beginning June 3, 1994, the Secretary of the Interior must arrange a survey
of the local conditions of the tribal justice systems and Courts of Indian
Offenses." This survey will allow for a determination of resources and
funding needed to "provide expeditious and effective administration of
justice."'" The survey is to be conducted annually by a nonfederal
entity.'6 7
The local conditions to be surveyed include the geographic and
demographic area, the volume and complexity of the caseloads, the facilities
and resources available, the funding levels and staffing requirements for the
tribal justice systems, the functioning and capacity levels of the tribal justice
systems, and the training and technological assistance needs of the tribal
justice systems.'" The Indian tribes are to be consulted regarding the
conduct of the survey.'" The tribes are also to be given the opportunity to
review and make recommendations regarding the survey findings before they
are reported to the Secretary of the Interior and Congress. 7
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, pursuant to the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act,17 1 to enter into contracts,
grants, or agreements with the Indian tribes for the performance of any Office
function." Any financial assistance provided through the agreements,
contracts or grants, may be used for the development, enhancement, and
continuing operation of tribal justice systems and traditional tribal judicial
practices by Indian tribes, as well as tribal judicial conferences.'
Tribal judicial conferences are to be supported with funds provided for by
the Act. 4 The conferences are established pursuant to the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act.7 5 The money provided to
these conferences may be used for hiring judges and other court officials. "
Law libraries and computer research materials may also be purchased.'" In
164. Id. § 3611(f.
165. Id. § 3612(a).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 3612(a).
168. Id. § 3612(b).
169. Id. § 3612(c).
170. Id.
171. 25 U.S.C. § 450(a)(1) (1988). The Act states, in relevant part: "[F]ull opportunity [shall
be provided] to develop leadership skills ... [for] self-government . .. [giving Indians] an
effective voice in planning and implementing programs for the benefit of Indians . Id.
172. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a) (Vest Supp. 1994).
173, Id. § 3613(b).
174. Id. § 3614.
175. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 455-458e (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
176. 25 U.S.C.A. § 3614(1) (West Supp. 1994).
177. Id. § 3614(3).
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addition, tribal judicial personnel training programs and continuing education
may be established.'78 These funds provide for the planning for the
development, enhancement, and operation of tribal justice systems is provided
for by these funds.'"
The base support funding for the tribal justice systems will be established
by the Secretary of the Interior with full participation by the Indian tribes no
later than June 1994.'" Factors to be considered in establishing the base
support funding include, but are not limited to, the data developed as a result
of the survey conducted according to the Act as well as any other relevant
assessment standards.'8'
Congress has authorized the appropriation of funds to carry out the
Provisions of the Act."n The funds are to be allocated for each fiscal year
from 1994 to 2000.'8 A total of $7 million is provided to establish and
provide funds for the functions of the Office of Tribal Justice Support'
4
This money may not be used for administrative expenses of the Office,' so
an additional $500,000 is allotted for administrative expenses." In addition,
$50 million is provided for the base support funding for each tribal justice
system.' 7 The tribal judicial conferences receive $500,000 for each fiscal
year and the annual survey is appropriated $400,000.2' This funding is not
to be subjected to the Indian priority system nor is it to be offset.'
178. Id. § 3614(4).
179. Id. § 3614(6).
180. Id. § 3613(c)(1).
181. Id. § 3613(c)(2)-(3).
182. Id. § 3621.
183. Id.
184. Id. § 3621(a).
185. Id.
E86. Id. § 3621(c).
187. Id. § 3621(b).
188. Id. § 3621(d), (e).
189. Id. § 3621(0, (h).
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